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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftiche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Die Relativität der Zeit. KURT BERNHARD. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVIII, 3, pp. 311–323.

Space and time are usually conjoined as necessary principles of thought. This is not a bad generalization if it is further understood that no such principles are absolute, that they are all more or less arbitrary assumptions. As between space and time, however, space is really the more fundamental, since it can be conceived of apart from time and can be described in terms of its own qualities, as, for example, in geometry. But the reverse does not follow. Hence time is relative because definable only in spatial terms. To give a definition:—Time is the medium of differentiation in space. This is equivalent to saying that without time there can be no change. The so-called time-feeling does not prove the existence of an absolute time, for it can always be reduced to perception of changes in space. Other considerations help to prove the relativity of time. Duration is an interval between two moments; but moments, *i. e.*, points in time, cannot be defined without reference to space. The best symbol of time is the straight line,—an obvious spatial analogy. Measurement of time is always an arbitrary procedure in which units are chosen such as will best fit the case in hand. Yet for other cases different units might have to be employed. Thus we divide time into days, hours, minutes and so on because these units happen to accord with the motion of the planet on which we dwell. But beyond the limits of the solar system they would lose their meaning, as they do even for us in the contemplation of remote past ages when the earth did not exist in its present form.

E. T. PAINE.

Ist Schopenhauer ein Mann der Vergangenheit oder ein Mann der Zukunft? RICHARD GROEPER. Ar. f. G. Ph., XVIII, 4, pp. 429–446.

Schopenhauer's early popularity was due in large measure to a philosophy of pessimism which the world has since outgrown. His future influence, accordingly, will have to make itself felt in other directions; but there are good reasons for believing that it will long be powerful. Schopenhauer created a new philosophical ideal. He was himself a thinker of the modern type, profoundly interested in science and in the world at large. Philosophy after him could not remain what it had been before, scholastic, secluded and barren. Through him it was revivified and filled with the spirit of the nineteenth century. Without Schopenhauer, one may say, there could have been no Fechner; without Fechner, no Wundt. These qualities of Schopenhauer and his further merit as a stylist do not prove the inner worth of his philosophy. Here his claim is founded on his breadth of view (he aimed at *totality*) and on his central doctrine of Will. Though Schopenhauer was unaware of its full significance, the evolutionary theory was just forthcoming as if to express in scientific terms his own metaphysical solution of the problem of existence. But quite independently Schopenhauer's philosophy of Will gained a strong position in subsequent thought, affecting the whole current of psychology, religion and literature. Particularly in the latter its influence is still at work. To mention Hauptmann and Ibsen is to suggest their kinship with Schopenhauer; and other writers like Strindberg, Tolstoi and Gorki exhibit similar tendencies.

E. T. PAINE.

Nietzsche und der Pragmatismus. EGGENSCHWYLER. Ar. f. G. Ph., XVIII, 4, pp. 447-455.

In his recent book *Un Romantisme Utilitaire* René Berthelot holds that Nietzsche was a disciple of the utilitarians and a forerunner of pragmatism. What a daring attempt toward classification at any price! Nietzsche was too original and independent to be thus "historically explained." There are, to be sure, resemblances between Nietzsche and James. Both fought the old one-sided rationalism which regarded man as merely a logical being. Both insisted upon the superior power of the instinctive, unreflective elements in human nature. Both believed error to be inevitable and frankly called in question the usefulness of truth. But their positive doctrines, epistemological and ethical, were fundamentally different. James converted his epistemological uncertainty into a moral formula and bade men take their fine feelings for arguments, their strong convictions for truths. He was thus led to exalt the religious attitude of submission to a received ethical system and obedience to God. Nietzsche sharply distinguished theory of knowledge from wisdom of life, denying their interrelation. In ethics he glorified spiritual abandonment, extreme individualism, the Will to Power.

E. T. PAINE.

Néo-Darwinism et Néo-Lamarckism. H. LEBRUN. Rev. Néo-Sc., XIX, 75, pp. 379-403.

The neo-Darwinists have to agree that evolution is not a matter of chance, but is, in a way, determined. Otherwise, variations are not sufficiently accounted for by selection. The early Darwinists considered the conflict of the individual with his environment the sole cause of biogenetical phenomena. For fear of falling into Lamarckism they neglected a study of the organism itself. Since then, the microscopic researches of W. Roux and his assistants at Halle have led to the theory of cellular selection, which is based on a study of the structure of living organisms. The disciples of Roux are called organicists, which indicates that they do not give a complete system of evolution. They seek merely to elucidate anatomical and histological differentiation. According to their theory, cellular protoplasm is composed of many substances, responding differently to diverse excitations. The most active of these properties finally occupies the entire cell. As excitation varies with situation, it follows that all the cells of the body are differentiated according to position. Strife between cells determines the direction of cellular variation. In one cell contractile substance becomes a muscular element; in another, an absorbent element develops into a glandular cell; and in a third, a substance capable of transmitting impressions becomes a nerve cell. In time, functional excitation becomes so inherently a need, that its absence means atrophy and death for the cell. Not only the soft elements, as muscles, nerves, and glands, but also osseous tissues develop in the direction of the greatest effort; and this is not necessarily the direction given by heredity. The healing of fractured bones is a case in point, and is a modification which is not accounted for by the Darwinian theory. For Roux, heredity is continually combined with functional excitation, and its rôle is restricted to the transmission of the special chemical composition of the sexual cells; but he does not indicate how the somatic characters become a part of the chemically constituted germ-plasm. The theory of Roux depends upon experience for an explanation of known facts, and his method is truly scientific. That of Weissmann, on the other hand, starts from a false basis and proceeds by the aid of imagination, to apply old selectionist theories to recently discovered cytological facts. His theory of ancestral plasms is largely that of Jaeger and Nussbaum, concerning the continuity of life in the germ-plasm. Not all of the germ-plasm in the ovum is used to form the soma, but a little is kept in reserve to form the ovum of the following generation. After having tried to explain ontogenesis, Weissmann tried also to explain phylogenesis and the formation of new species. Here he followed Darwin rather than Lamarck, for he considered the germ cells to be incapable of being influenced by the modifying action of the *milieu*. He failed to prove, however, that the selection of favorable variations can explain adaptation, evolution, heredity, or regression. Finally, he modified his theory to accord more nearly with that of Roux, and introduced a conception of invisible particles having a determined form in the nucleus. In his last theory, as in the first, he recognizes two elements in the cell,—morphoplasm for the cellular body and idioplasm for the nucleus. The living substance in the nucleus is different from purely chemical substances, in that it is capable of nourishing itself and of reproducing itself. The biophores, or elementary particles, are found in larger groups, called determinants; and these, in turn, form perceptible granules called ides. He has applied the conception of Roux concerning the strife of parts within the organism to the products of his imagination, the determinants, in order to provide for germinal selection. In the ovum, when the determinants are reproduced by division, the resulting parts are never equal in size or in force, and there results a strife for nutrition and life. It follows that those organs which are already determined in the ovum by the robust determinants will be stronger and better developed, and that in each generation the advantageous characters will accumulate to the exclusion of others. Many of Weissmann's fundamental notions are no longer accepted. The theory of germinal selection rests finally upon the dogma of Darwin, but Weissmann makes of it, as of the other problems, a mere matter of words and abstractions. A theory founded on the hypothesis of particles representing the elementary characters of the individual is an impossible one; for if the characters are abstract they are of no use, and if they are not abstract they are impossible.

ALMA R. THORNE.

L'oubli et la personnalité. L. DUGAS. Rev. Ph., XXXVII, 10, pp. 338-358.

Much time has been devoted to the study of memory but relatively little to the study of forgetting. They are intimately connected, however. Forgetting is not the absence but the flight of memory; it is the inability to recall rather than to retain. Some think that a thing once learned will always leave some trace in memory, as seems to be shown by the facility with which a thing forgotten is relearned. There are different kinds and degrees of forgetting. In some cases it is advantageous and normal and in others it is abnormal and marks a disintegration of the self. The unity of memory depends upon a dropping out of unimportant factors in a given experience, but on the other hand, when important factors are forgotten, unity is destroyed. The growth of an individual is largely made possible by the selective function of memory, and selection is a process of leaving out as well as of choosing. A memory system constitutes the personality. Several such systems may exist side by side and relatively disconnected in the same individual without pathological results. Such memory systems need not be incompatible as in some striking abnormal cases. It is through this breaking up of the individual's interests into systems that an artist or scientist may so easily drop professional for private life. Memory hangs together in a single mass and is indeed the personality replete with all its wealth, as forgetting is the personality broken and ruined. Memory is never atomic but always synthetic. This is why it takes the whole personality to explain the particularities of remembrance and forgetting. Memory is then, in a sense, the personality; forgetting, the loss of personality; and the interest which attaches to the study of the two goes beyond the phenomena themselves and exhibits the evolution of the self.

H. G. TOWNSEND.

The Schema of Introspection. E. B. TITCHENER. Am. J. Ps., XXIII, 4, pp. 485-508.

In a previous paper the author pointed out the ambiguity of the term 'Introspection.' By it he here refers to "methods that are scientifically available and that appear to have been actually employed." Introspection is a generic term. It "presupposes the standpoint of descriptive psychology." The introspective method in psychology is closely analogous to observation and experiment in chemistry or biology, but when so taken we must beware of the 'stimulus error' and of confusing description with explanation. Introspection "implies two things: attention to the phenomena, and record of the phenomena." Description must proceed in terms of 'content processes,' and must be pushed just as far as possible. That the results, so far have been meagre and confused with extraneous material should not make us cease from "plodding the low *posteriori* road of observation." "A tentative application of G. E. Müller's formula to the recent experimental work on Thought and Volition confirms the results of the foregoing theoretical discussion, while at the same time it raises a number of further methodological questions."

H. G. TOWNSEND.

The Philosophy of Bergson. BERTRAND RUSSELL. Monist, XXII, pp. 321-347.

The first part of Mr. Russell's article consists of a statement of Bergson's theories of life and matter, intellect and intuition, duration, memory and freedom, largely in Bergson's own words. The second part is a criticism of these theories, as follows. Bergson's fundamental doctrines are those of space and time. Space is important because through it he condemns the intellect; and time because through it he vindicates freedom and change and explains the relation between mind and matter. The lack of support for his view that 'greater' and 'less' necessarily imply the spatial relation of container and contained is characteristic of his system as a whole. His insistence on the spatial character of numbers arises from a radical misconception of the abstract nature of numbers, and from a confusion between numbers as a general concept, various particular numbers, and various collections to which the particular numbers are applicable. The number 12, for example, as such is too abstract to be pictured in space; it is the common quality of all collections of twelve units. Bergson's condemnation of the intellect rests on the theory that every plurality of separate units involves space. Generalizing from his personal habit of visualizing, he declares that all separateness involves space: hence abstract ideas and the whole intellect depend on the habit of picturing things in space. The conclusion thus rests on a personal idiosyncrasy, leading to a mistaken notion of thought. Bergson's whole treatment of mathematics is in error, because he disregards the more recent developments in mathematical theory; for the paradox of motion is swept away by the mathematical conception of motion as a relation, not a thing. Bergson's theory of duration constantly presupposes the ordinary idea of time which he repudiates. His definitions of past and present are in terms of 'now' and 'no longer'—they assume the notion of the past as outside the present. When Bergson speaks of the past as only idea, as mingling with the present, he really means our present memory of the past; for when the past occurred, it was as active as the present is now. His theory of time therefore really omits time altogether. A similar confusion in *Matter and Memory* exists between the actor knowing and the object known. The distinction between subject and object is altogether lacking in Bergson's philosophy; and if one rejects this identification, the whole system collapses: the theories of time and space, freedom, the condemnation of the intellect, the relations of mind and matter, and the view of the universe as perpetual change, as unreflecting, purposeless activity.

NANN CLARK BARR.

The Causal Relation between Mind and Body. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., pp. 477–490.

The idea of a causal relation between mind and body is due to an attempt to make a concept hold good in relation to the "world of immediate experience" and the world of "reflection upon this immediate experience," which is properly applicable only to the worlds of "sense," of "science," and of "mechanism"—to adopt James's diverse Worlds of Reality whose concepts and relations are non-transferable, are real only internally to each system. In the field of introspective observation, our volitional experience gives rise to the concept of efficiency, which we have carried over into the physical world, thus bringing the idea of efficiency into causation. There is, however, no evidence of efficiency in the realm of nature, where causation depends on the idea of invariable, certain and unconditional sequences. The activities of body, without reference to consciousness, may be considered causally; but if we maintain this objective attitude we study behavior which has no connection with mind, and the concept of efficiency appears not to apply. On the other hand, when we study changes in consciousness, where efficiency is manifest, unconditional and invariable sequence is not apparent. If we hold that a bodily state causes a mental change, we assume without evidence efficiency in physical nature; or if we hold that a mental state causes a bodily act, we disregard the phenomena of habit, in which no antecedent mental state occurs. Moreover, though certain states often follow given bodily activities and *vice versa,* the sequence is not invariable. But if we do not take the leap to the physical world, introspection shows nerve activities and objects of the outer world as complex systems within consciousness, so that a neururgic-noetic correspondence may take place, while remaining in the realm where causation does not apply. When this correspondence appears to be only partial, one of the states, mental or nervous, has fallen below the surface of awareness and has been overlooked.

NANN CLARK BARR.

Über die Unterscheidung zwischen logischer und empirischer Wahrheit. F. M. URBAN. V. f. w. Ph., XXXVI, 2, pp. 195–228.

The author begins by pointing out that propositions are usually divided into three groups. First, definitions, as those in geometry and anatomy. Second, expressions of identity (equations) or of relation, which are by no means formulated promiscuously but always according to certain related groups. Third, the class of propositions comprising the expression of an event. A science is merely a group of propositions which expresses a part of experience. The purpose of science is to explain natural phenomena by logical deduction from a given group of propositions. A proposition is true if it represents a given circumstance in our experience, which characteristic we will call empirical truth. Mathematics, however, is the best known example of a science which employs only pure logical operations for the derivation of its formulas. In its universality, the main proposition comprises more than our immediate experience can prove, because it is general and we have experience only of the particular. Therefore, since in a complete system the separate axioms are independent, we do not question its logical truth, but only its empirical truth. The fact that in geometry and natural science we find systems of propositions which are apparently manifest and from which we can undoubtedly deduce an unlimited number of propositions which are verified in our experience, could not fail to arouse the greatest interest and to leave us with the question as to how we get these propositions and how such a system is distinguished from others with equally manifest propositions. In this connection, it is interesting to investigate the origin and history of the formation of our mathematical propositions. However, our knowledge of the historical process of the formation of the Euclidean axioms is very limited; likewise with the physical and mechanical axioms. The common explanation of the numerous theories is that all knowledge begins with experience and the question only arises as to whether all knowledge likewise originates from experience. The history of mechanics shows clearly what the history of geometry does not, namely, that its axioms are not the beginning of its history, but the result and conclusion of development. The historical development of a science begins with propositions of only slight universality whose empirical origin is more or less clearly evident. This is true not only of the natural sciences, but even of algebra. These propositions are in turn united into one system, from which we soon reach more general propositions (*Obersätze*) by idealizing our experience, and the formation of such systems is undoubtedly the very goal of our scientific efforts. The ideal of science would be reached if we could explain all our experiences from a limited number of fundamental propositions. Furthermore, efforts are ever directed toward constructing a system of the greatest possible stability which will be immune from future variations or changes. However, this demand is answered by systems which best agree with present experience. Though, in the future, changes should be necessary in the Euclidean axioms, they can only be very slight. The investigations of many men such as Royce, Couturat, Pierce, and especially B. Russell, have shown that the presuppositions of logic also suffice for the deductions in Algebra, and that accordingly all existing notions (*Begriffe*) of pure mathematics may be defined directly or indirectly by a very limited number of simpler notions. We may therefore hope that this process of the alliance of systems will likewise make rapid progress in the other departments of science. Thus, we might say in conclusion, that in the historical development of a science, we begin with empirical truths, and by careful generalization and induction we arrive at fewer and more universally valid logical truths. Ultimately the *logical truth* of such a scientific system will be evident from the fact that each of its propositions is consistent with the presupposition from which it was derived. Its *empirical truth*, on the other hand, will consist in the agreement of these same propositions with the data of our experience.

EMANUEL R. ENGEL.

On Relations; and in Particular the Cognitive Relation. S. ALEXANDER. Mind, N. S., No. 83, pp. 305-328.

1. Relations are the whole situation into which terms enter, so far as the situation concerns the relation. Relations need not be regarded as the work of the mind. It is only the categorical character of such relations as likeness, difference, identity, etc., which misleads into attributing to them a subjective origin. What the objective situations which constitute such relations as likeness, difference, etc., are, could only be ascertained by a full inquiry into universals and particulars. 2. In the strict sense relations are neither internal nor external to their terms. They are internal to their terms in the sense that they cannot exist independently of their terms. If we separate the world into terms *and* their relations we are making an abstraction. The world consists of things *in* their relations. 3. Some relations are intrinsic to their terms, such as likeness, difference, etc. Others like paternity, etc., are extrinsic to their terms. Three kinds of relations are distinguished, viz.: (1) Those which are intrinsic as belonging to things necessarily, *i. e.*, to everything; (2) those intrinsic to a type, but not necessary to the existence of everything; (3) those which are extrinsic simply. (1) is categorical, (2) and (3) are empirical. This distinction of categorical and empirical relations affects the answer to the question whether there can be any truth or reality short of the absolute or whole reality. 4. In the relation of knowing two things are to be firmly held. (1) The generic character of knowing is the most elementary of all relations.—The relation of togetherness occurs wherever there are finite individuals in the world, relatively independent or separate but belonging to one world. (2) This is a relation of knowing in the proper sense only when one member of the relation is a mind. 5. How is the relation of togetherness experienced? It is experienced in the enjoyment of the perceiving. In perceiving, I enjoy my own act as together with the object contemplated, and the relation is thus exhausted in the enjoyment. 6. Is this the whole of knowing? No. Time and space relations with the object contemplated are also enjoyed.

7. *Sensory Experience.* What is the character of the relation as experienced in sensory cognition? In sensory experience it is true *on the basis of experience itself* that the mind is causally affected by the object which it contemplates,—the perceiving act entering into relation with the perceived object as not only together with it but as an enjoyed effect of it. And implied in the effect relation are relations of time and space. The reciprocal causality of patient upon the agent can be traced in the tendency of our perceptual conation to react upon the object. This leads to imaging. Imaging leaves us with a mere idea; it gropes for an object and does not find it. Thinking directly or indirectly brings us back into touch with sensible reality. In thinking we enjoy this reciprocal (or our own) causality. We do not enjoy the effect from the proposition we discover as we enjoy effect from sensation; but ultimately our object is related to sense.

Roy C. Holl.

Pourquoi l'espace a trois dimensions. H. Poincaré. Rev. de Mét., XX, 4, pp. 483-504.

Geometricians distinguish two sorts of geometry, one largely quantitative, the other largely qualitative. There is, however, a purely qualitative geometry, the "Analysis Situs." In this study two figures are equivalent when one can pass to the other by a continual change of form. Thus a circle is equivalent to an ellipse. Space is relative. We with all our surroundings could be moved in space, or all dimensions could be changed in the same ratio without our knowledge. Space is neither metrical nor extensive. Its only properties are dimension and continuity. To define a continuity of n dimensions as a system of n independent coördinates, each of definite value, is not wholly satisfactory. Two such spaces can differ only in point of view. In space the number of dimensions is determined by the theory of limits. Imagine a closed curve of but one dimension. If on this curve we mark two points over which we cannot pass, the curve is cut into parts. But if we mark two or more points on a surface, this continuity of two dimensions will not be decomposed into parts. Yet if we trace on the surface one or several closed curves, it is divided. We come now to the case of space. One can divide it, neither by localizing of points, nor by lines; a continuity of two dimensions is necessary. That is why we say space has three dimensions. To imagine a continuous chain of sensation composing a unity of such sort that each element is indistinguishable from the following element, is to form a continuity of one dimension. This is the same general law; a continuity has n dimensions when it may be divided by a continuity of $n - 1$ dimensions. Combining visual with tactile space gives five dimensions. These reduce themselves to three by means of experiential interpretation of sensation. We have an intuition of continuity. That is, we have the ability to construct a physical and a mathematical continuity. This ability is preëxistent to experience, because, without it, experience would reduce to brute sensation. However this faculty could be exercised in different directions. It could construct space of four just as well as of three dimensions. Experience determines the exercise of sense in one direction rather than another.

H. R. BROCKETT.

Le progrès social comme substitution de valeurs. A. CHIAPELLI. Rev. de Mét., XX, 5, pp. 623–637.

The question of the reality and form of human progress is not solved by sociology and history, descriptive sciences which treat of collective human activity as it manifests itself in time and space; nor by ethics, a normative science that proposes to model conduct in view of an end of ideal conduct, but rather occupies a middle ground and presupposes both that which is and that which should be. The different attempts to construct a social science and a philosophy of history upon social value appear to take the means for the end, equality and liberty having value only as conditions of civilization. When we study and judge the social life and the historical development, we have no universal system of values. Progress and regression cannot then be measured simply by a feeling of pleasure and good, by purely eudemonistic criteria, for the value of individual or social life does not reside in the element of pleasure. Similar conclusions in regard to other measures of value have led the writer to interpret the progress of civilization rather as a succession and a continual substitution than as a direct increase or decrease of value. This comprehensive view of history as a succession of values is the reality of progress.

H. R. BROCKETT.

The Essence of Religion. BERTRAND RUSSELL. Hibbert Jour., XI, 1, pp. 46–62.

The quality of infinity which frees man from finite limitations, and which does not rest on dogmas, is the essence of religion. Man is both finite and infinite; his finite nature seeks to imprison his infinite nature by the here and now. But when the self gains freedom from the everyday pettinesses of the world and finds the quality of infinity, it experiences that which is essential to religion. This experience comes only in a self-surrender in which the cell interprets anew the things about it and for whom a new life with larger visions and broader hopes opens up. This new birth does not rest on the traditional beliefs, yet there are in Christianity three interrelated elements which should be preserved,—worship, acquiescence, and love. Worship, whose essential constituents are joy, reverence, and a sense of mystery, has for its object either that which is good or that which exists, actually or ideally. Religion, which results from the union of these, seeks to make more good exist and more of existence good. In a world of so much sin and evil, our happiness demands that we acquiesce in the wrongs beyond our control. We should, however, not seek an acquiescence in which the evil appears as good, but one in which the dualism of good and bad is not too strongly emphasized, one in which we realize the necessity of what is, and hence are liberated from indignation. Love is characterized by service, which is earthly love, and by contemplation which is divine love. The former selects the good and beautiful, while the latter is given to all indifferently. The former may cause discord; the latter promotes union and harmony and opens the way to life in the infinite. These three elements, worship, acquiescence and love, are interrelated and their combination, which is life in the infinite, contains all that is essential to religion. In short, the essence of religion lies in the subordination of the finite part of our life to the infinite part.

FRANK DICKINSON.

The Identity of the Ideals. JOHN E. BOODIN. Int. J. E., XXIII, 1, pp. 29–50.

The ideals of truth, beauty and virtue are identical in form but are differentiated in content. Their kinship, though confusedly expressed, was felt by the Hebrews, Plato, Shaftesbury, Lotze and Everett. Their differentiation received the same confused treatment; for, contrary to its conclusions, we need, in all three ideals, both the focus of interest and the larger cosmic setting. Similarly we find activity with the aim of improvement common to all. Further, as being created, each involves effort; as being observed, each, equally well, arouses immediate appreciation. Again, not only does each ideal activity have its ought, its ideal, but it is also related to life as a whole in which it spreads out into a larger activity. As already created none of them develop; as being created they all develop. Although truth seems to be rigid, and virtue and beauty plastic, yet from either the point of view of retrospect or prospect, all are equally rigid or plastic. Thus all these differentia are found to be due to a confusion in the point of view; the difference does not lie in form but in content. Further investigation will show that our ideals must meet the requirements of unity, by embodying one idea; of harmony, by possessing parts which support each other; of simplicity, by containing nothing superfluous; and of universality, by claiming universal acceptance. The suggested characteristic of clearness and distinctness, being included in the above requirements, does not simplify them. To fulfil the ideal demands of these requirements, in the cognitive, appreciative and volitional realms of human nature, constitutes idealization in terms of truth, beauty and virtue respectively. Although identical in form, these are different in the concrete. Through conceptual relations, science seeks complete systematization in its special field; through concrete imagination, art aims to break up and systematize reality; and through impulse ethics seeks harmonious adjustment of the individual to the historic will. However, these ideals must fundamentally and ultimately agree; that which expresses one ideal expresses the others also. In the idealization of human nature as individual, an ultimate ideal must be found which, too, has unity, harmony, simplicity and universality in the cognitive, emotional and volitional aspect. But such wholeness cannot be found within human realization. Since our nature cannot rest in imperfections, our religious consciousness ekes out our finite limitations and posits a unity which we worship as God.

FRANK DICKINSON.